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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PARM](#) [MNUC](#) [MARR](#) [CH](#)

SUBJECT: REQUEST TO ALLIES FOR NEW DEMARCHE TO CHINA REGARDING CHINA'S JANUARY 2007 ANTI-SATELLITE TEST

REF: (A)07 STATE 4837 (NOTAL), (B)07 BEIJING 331, (C)07 BEIJING 473, (D)07 STATE 4836, (E)07 BEIJING 4185

CLASSIFIED BY ACTING U/S FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (T) JOHN C. ROOD, REASONS, 1.4 (B) AND (D).

1.(SBU) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. See paragraph 3 below.

2.(S) BACKGROUND: On January 11, 2007 (UTC), China conducted an anti-satellite (ASAT) test by launching a ground-based weapon against one of its satellites.

3.(S) GUIDANCE REQUEST: For Berlin, Canberra, London, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, Seoul, Tel Aviv, and Tokyo: Ambassador or other senior Embassy officials.

5.The U.S. demarche to China in paragraph 5 should be left as a non-paper for host Nation's information. Embassies are requested to provide copies to their respective governments.

4.(SBU) BEGIN CAPITAL-SPECIFIC TALKING POINTS: a. (S//REL AS, CA, FR, GM, IS, IT, JP, ROK, and UK) FOR ALL:

-- The United States delivered a demarche to the People's Republic of China on or about January 7, 2008, concerning China's continued refusal to negotiate a ban on ASAT tests.

-- Despite expressions of concern by the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, South Korea, France and several other nations, China has continued to conduct ASAT tests.

-- Over the nearly 12 months since these demarches, the U.S. has made numerous follow-up requests for answers in both diplomatic and military contexts.

-- The United States requests your government's assistance in applying diplomatic pressure to the Chinese government to respond to several important questions.

-- We have provided China with a non-paper detailing our specific concerns. We are sharing this non-paper with you and other key allies.

-- We look forward to continuing our discussions with your government on this topic. b. (S//REL AS, CA, JP, ROK, and UK) For Canberra, London, and Paris: END CAPITAL-SPECIFIC TALKING POINTS.

5.(S//REL AS, CA, FR, GM, IS, IT, JP, ROK, and UK) BEGIN U.S. DEMARCHE TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:

-- As Ambassador Randt explained in a demarche to Assistant Foreign Minister He on January 15, 2007, and in follow-up discussions throughout 2007, the United States has increased hazards to other peaceful uses of space in low earth orbit by the United States and other spacefaring nations.

-- This is a very serious matter for the entire international community.

-- Unfettered access to space and the capabilities provided by satellites in orbit are vital to United States national and economic security.

-- The United States considers space systems to have the rights of unhindered passage through, and operations in, space without interference.

-- Any purposeful interference with U.S. space systems will be interpreted by the United States as an infringement of its rights and considerations.

-- The United States reserves the right, consistent with the UN Charter and international law, to defend and protect its space systems with a minimum of force.

-- Purposeful interference with the space systems of other nations which are used by the United States for peaceful purposes in pursuit of U.S. national security interests is unacceptable.

-- It has been nearly a year since China intentionally destroyed an aging weather satellite using a ground-based direct-ascent ASAT weapon.

-- Since this flight-test occurred on January 11, 2007, the United States has detected and tracked over 2,500 pieces of orbital debris directly associated with the test.

-- Our experts estimate that many of these pieces, and as many as 100,000 smaller debris objects, some of which will remain in orbit for the next 10 years, pose a significant threat to other satellites.

-- Currently, of all identified satellite (spacecraft and rocket bodies) breakup debris now in low Earth orbit, 45 percent was generated by China.

-- China is now responsible for more breakup debris in low earth orbit than any other state.

-- We have already been compelled to take precautionary measures to maneuver U.S. satellites to reduce the probability of collision with the debris.

-- China's intentional destruction of a satellite, and the resultant creation of long-lived debris, is contrary to international Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines.

-- Under the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, China may be liable for damage caused by debris from China.

-- The contradiction between China's statements and actions in this area raise questions about the credibility of China's declaratory policies.

-- The United States believes China's development and testing of such capabilities is inconsistent with the constructive relationship that our two countries share.

-- The inadequate nature of China's response to our January 15, 2007, demarche and your government's continued unwillingness to provide a full answer to our questions is unacceptable.

-- As Secretary of Defense Gates noted in his meeting with President Hu on November 6, 2007, the United States remains interested in talking to China about this issue.

-- Such a dialogue could help reduce the risk of misunderstanding or miscalculation.

-- As we look to the future, we expect China to bear in mind the requirement under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, to which China is party.

-- The U.S. is refraining from any expansion of space-related cooperation with China. One of the primary reasons for this position is the continued lack of transparency from China regarding its space program.

-- What analysis did China perform to estimate the debris that would be caused by the intentional destruction of your satellite in the January 2007 test?

-- What steps did China take to mitigate damage to the satellites of other countries?

-- What are China's future intentions for its direct-ascent ASAT development and testing program?

-- Will there be further tests of a direct-ascent anti-satellite weapon or other anti-satellite weapons, capabilities, or technologies? If so, when?

-- How will your government ensure that further testing does not create new hazards for human spaceflight and other space activities?

-- What notification will China provide for any future ASAT tests?

--- Are you planning to deploy your ground-based direct- ascent ASAT, or other, similar weapons, capabilities, or technologies?

END U.S. DEMARCHE TO CHINA.

6.(S//REL AS, CA, FR, GM, IS, IT, JP, ROK, and UK) BEGIN "IF RAISED" TALKING POINTS: a. If host government notes that the U.S. has opposed China's draft treaty, we understand that China may join Russia in introducing it in this CD session. b. We carefully studied the draft treaty circulated by Russia last summer, which we understand was developed in collaboration with China. It prohibits the development and deployment of a ground-based direct- ascent interceptor of the type of ASAT. c. Notably, the draft treaty would not prohibit the development and deployment of a ground-based direct- ascent interceptor of the type of ASAT. d. We remain convinced that there is no arms race in space but rather unprecedented cooperation. The CD needs to move beyond unnecessary, counterproductive language. e. The United States will support efforts to explore new voluntary "Best Practices Guidelines" in the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the UN Committee on Space Law. f. Our National Space Policy makes clear, however, that we will oppose new, legally-binding regimes that seek to limit our access to, and use of, space. g. It is not in the interest of any U.S. ally or friend that the CD be diverted toward work on treaty regimes that could be used to limit legitimate national security activities. h. Currently, of all identified satellite (spacecraft and rocket bodies) breakup debris now in low Earth orbit, 45 percent was generated by China. i. China is now responsible for more breakup debris in low earth orbit than anyone else. j. All breakup debris attributed to the U.S. that is now in low earth orbit was caused by accidents (e.g., fuel tank explosions) and other unintentional events. k. The United States has not conducted an anti-satellite test since 1985. The Cold War is over and the world economy is now significantly more interconnected. l. The majority of the debris created by the 1985 U.S. test reentered the atmosphere within less than three years, and none remains in orbit today. m. The majority of trackable debris objects (e.g., those with areas larger than 10 square centimeters) created by China's ASAT test will remain in orbit for decades. n. Less than three years after conducting this test, the United States adopted the first of a series of national policies directing all U.S. space agencies to take steps to reduce the risk of orbital debris. o. In fact, the longevity of the debris resulting from the 1985 ASAT test led directly to U.S. Department of Defense and then national-level guidelines for debris mitigation. p. The U.S. has actively worked with other nations to protect the space environment for future generations. q. These efforts include development of voluntary guidelines in the Inter-Agency Debris Coordination (IADC) committee and the UN Committee on Space Law. r. The U.S. also supports consideration at COPUOS of new voluntary "Best Practice Guidelines" to ensure safe space operations by all spacefaring nations. s. China's civil national space agency participated in developing the IADC and COPUOS debris mitigation guidelines, which specifically call for nations to avoid creating orbital debris. t. The United States does not have any "weapons" in space, nor do we have any plans to field such weapons. u. If host government raises points about missile defense, we note that the U.S. missile defense system is strictly a defensive system. Missile defense protects people from attack, potentially saving many lives. v. The United States will continue to offer basic warning advisories which China could use to protecting Chinese spacecraft carrying astronauts. w. These advisories are offered in the spirit of cooperation and mutual assistance to minimize dangers to Chinese astronauts in their role as crew members of international space exploration missions. RICE